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THE SIXTEENTH ANNUAL
LLOYD K. GARRISON LECTURE
Storm King Revisited:
A View From the Mountaintop
ALBERT K. BUTZEL*
It is a privilege for me to be here this afternoon to deliver a
lecture in honor of my mentor, Lloyd Garrison. Hard as it is to
believe, it was forty-five years ago, almost to the day, that I was
summoned to Mr. Garrison’s office on the twelfth floor at 575
Madison Avenue, handed an opinion issued two weeks earlier by
what was then known as the Federal Power Commission (FPC),
given two hours to read it, and asked to return to his office for an
afternoon conference with the lawyers.
It was by complete serendipity that I ended up in Mr.
Garrison’s office that day in 1965. When I had gone to Paul
Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison six months earlier, I had
agreed to do anything but litigation. That day, however, there
were no litigation associates available. So I was commandeered
from the corporate department to help on what became the Storm
King case.
That is what I am going to talk about today, but not by
simply rehashing what is already well known. I want to tell you
* Albert K. Butzel is the principal of Albert K. Butzel Law Offices. He has
practiced law and led advocacy campaigns in New York City since 1965. He
litigated the Storm King case for 15 years until its conclusion. This article and
the underlying factual information were first presented at Pace University
School of Law on April 15, 2010 as the Sixteenth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison
Lecture on Environmental Law. I want to thank Professor Nicholas Robinson
for inviting me to deliver the Sixteenth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on
Environmental Law. I also want to thank my friend, Professor Oliver Houck, for
the many insights he has given me regarding the Storm King case and
environmental law in general. Finally, I thank those who gave this Lecture
before me, from whom I have drawn a number of the thoughts that I have
offered in this year’s Lecture.
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the story of the case, not just focus on the outcome. And I want to
give you my impression of where environmental litigation stands
up today measured against the promise of the Storm King
decision.1
The first part of the story is about Lloyd Garrison. To begin
with, Lloyd was not a litigator. His expertise lay in corporate and
labor law. A native of New York City, after graduating from
Harvard College and Law School, he returned to the City in 1922,
working at the law firm of Elihu Root, winner of the 1912 Nobel
Peace Prize, who became Lloyd’s mentor. Several years later, Mr.
Garrison began his career in public service as Special Assistant to
the U.S. Attorney General. In 1932, he was appointed Dean of
the University of Wisconsin Law School, transforming it over the
next fourteen years into one of America’s top law schools. During
this time, he also served as the first Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Board and later as its General Counsel. He was
a central figure on the War Labor Board and bore much of the
burden of maintaining labor-management peace during the
Second World War. After the War, he joined three other partners
to form Paul Weiss. In the ensuing twenty years, he had a
distinguished career as a lawyer while also being heavily involved
in matters of public interest. Long interested in civil rights, he
was president of the National Urban League from 1947 to 1952,
and he represented Arthur Miller and Langston Hughes when
they were summoned before the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities.2 It was shortly after this that he suffered a
1. There are several excellent books that tell the Storm King story. See, e.g.,
ALLAN R. TALBOT, POWER ALONG THE HUDSON: THE STORM KING CASE AND THE
BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1972); FRANCES F. DUNWELL, THE HUDSON RIVER
HIGHLANDS, 202-230 (1991); ROBERT H. BOYLE, THE HUDSON RIVER: A NATURAL
AND UNNATURAL HISTORY 124-52 (1969). Also well worth reading is OLIVER
HOUCK, TAKING BACK EDEN: EIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL CASES THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD, 7-21 (2010). An excellent collection of source materials relating to the
Storm King case and other power plants on the Hudson was put together by
Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod. See THE HUDSON RIVER POWER PLANT
SETTLEMENT: MATERIALS PREPARED FOR A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW AND THE NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
WITH SUPPORT FROM THE JOHN A. HARTFORD FOUNDATION, INC. (Ross Sandler &
David Schoenbrod eds., 1981) [hereinafter SETTLEMENT MATERIALS].
2 See Lee A. Daniels, Lloyd K. Garrison, Lawyer, Dies; Leader in Social Causes
was 92, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at D20 [hereinafter Obituary]; see also
HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, Garrison, Lloyd K. (Lloyd Kirkham). Papers,
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loss that sometimes seemed to him to offset his other
accomplishments. He represented Robert Oppenheimer before
the Atomic Energy Commission when Oppenheimer lost his
security clearance, something Lloyd felt he was personally
responsible for.3
Perhaps it was his sense of having failed Oppenheimer that
led Mr. Garrison to take on another seemingly hopeless case—the
appeal of the FPC decision that had licensed the Storm King
Project. Up to that point, no FPC license for a hydroelectric plant
had been successfully challenged on the merits, and there was
little reason to be optimistic about a case where the central issue
was a complaint that the Project would damage scenic beauty.
But for Lloyd, the representation was as much personal as
professional. He cared deeply about the natural world and loved
the Hudson.
There was no such thing as environmentalism at the time,
but there was a long history of conservation—a good deal of which
emanated from New York and the Hudson River. It is no
accident that Theodore Roosevelt was a New Yorker. It is no
accident that J.P. Morgan, Colonel Rupert, the Rockefellers, the
Harrimans, the Perkins, and many other wealthy families built
their summer homes in the Hudson Highlands.4 Nor is it
serendipity that the Adirondacks were declared “forever wild” at
the instance of New York City families in 1892, or that in 1910,
Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of New York and later
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, signed into law an extension
for the Palisades Park to include the Highlands as far north as
Newburgh.5 John Muir may have founded the conservation
movement, but it was the wealth of New York City—and the
interest of its patricians—that fueled it. It should, then, be no
surprise that Lloyd Garrison, great-grandson of the abolitionist
1893-1990: Finding Aid, http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/ deliver/~law00054
(last visited Sept. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Finding Aid]; LLOYD K. GARRISON,
REMINISCENCES OF LLOYD KIRKHAM GARRISON: ORAL HISTORY (1969) [hereinafter
ORAL HISTORY I]; LLOYD K. GARRISON, REMINISCENCES OF LLOYD KIRKHAM
GARRISON: ORAL HISTORY (1982) [hereinafter ORAL HISTORY II].
3. See Obituary, supra note 2; see also Finding Aid, supra note 2; ORAL
HISTORY I, supra note 2; ORAL HISTORY II, supra note 2.
4. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 111-137.
5. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 138-165.
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William Lloyd Garrison, himself a New Yorker by heritage, cared
about the land and believed in conservation. So when he was
asked to take an appeal to the Second Circuit, there was no way
he was going to say no.
The appeal was from a decision of the Federal Power
Commission, since renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.6 The FPC had just granted a license for what Con
Edison had named the “Cornwall Project”—a reference to the
town in which plant was to be built. It was to be the largest
pumped storage hydroelectric project in the world, capable of
providing 20% of New York City’s peak energy load. The
powerhouse was to be carved into the north flank of Storm King
Mountain, extending 800 feet along the shore and rising 110 feet
above the Hudson, with eight six-story transformers and a huge
crane on top of it. The powerhouse would contain a series of socalled “reversible” pump-turbines that would be used at night to
pump water from the Hudson into a reservoir 1,000 feet above the
River, where it would be stored until daytime electric demand
began to grow. Then the water would be released to course down
through a huge tunnel and drive the reversed pumps—now
turbines—generating power at the time it was needed most. It
would take three kilowatts of power to pump the water up to the
reservoir for each two kilowatts that came from the Project. But
the three kilowatts would come from efficient plants that were
not being fully utilized at night, while the two kilowatts would be
available at peak hours when Con Edison’s other capacity was
limited. In effect, the plan was to create a huge storage battery
at Storm King Mountain.7
The problem was that the plant was to be located at one of
the most dramatic and beautiful spots on the Hudson or any
other eastern river. The Hudson Highlands were, as Life
Magazine described them in 1964, “one of the grandest passages
of River scenery in the world.”8 The great German traveler
6. See generally Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., Fed. Power Comm’n
Opinion No. 452, Project No. 2338, 57 P.U.R.3d 279 (F.P.C.) (1965) [hereinafter
FPC Opinion No. 452].
7. See FPC Opinion No. 452, supra note 6; Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 611-12 (2d Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Scenic
Hudson I].
8. Editorial: Must God’s Junkyard Grow?, LIFE MAG., July 31, 1964, at 4.
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Baedeker had found the landscape of the Highlands to be
“grander and more inspiring than the Rhine’s,”9 while the New
York Times, editorializing against the Project, described the area
as “one of the most stunning regions in the Eastern United
States.”10 And the northern portal to the Gorge, with Storm King
on the west and Breakneck Ridge on the east, provided the most
magnificent of all views.
It was into this scene that the powerhouse would be carved.
An artist’s rendering in Con Edison’s 1962 Annual Report sent to
its shareholders in April 1963 showed the side of the Mountain
cut away, leaving a gash the size of three football fields laid endon-end with a high cliff behind.11 It was this illustration, in
particular, that roused lovers of the Highlands to action. There
was little precedent for citizen opposition in these circumstances,
but a small group of individuals organized themselves as the

9. Editorial: Defacing the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1963, at 22. See also
Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d at 613.
10. Editorial, supra note 9. The Times Editorial read, in relevant part, as
follows:
If any utility proposed to construct a plant in the middle of Central
Park, the absurdity of such a defacement of precious natural (or
nearly natural) surroundings would be immediately apparent. It is
almost as bad to plunk down a couple of power installations right in
the heart one of the most stunning natural regions in the Eastern
United States: Storm King Mountain (north of Bear Mountain and
West Point) and Breakneck Ridge on the opposite (eastern) side of
the Hudson.
All of us who have driven down from New England and northern
New York have looked with awe at these breath-taking mountains.
All of us who have hiked and played in the Palisades Interstate Park
know what a beautiful backyard exits 50 miles north of New York.
Is it too close to home to appreciate? “This is a very good land to fall
with and a pleasant land to see,” said one of Henry Hudson’s officers,
going up the river under these high blue hills. The great traveler
Baedeker found the Hudson’s scenery “grander and more inspiring”
than the Rhine’s.
The proposed power plants of Consolidated Edison at Storm King
and of Central Hudson Gas and Electric at Breakneck Ridge would
desecrate great areas that are part of the natural and historic
heritage of our country, are still largely unspoiled and should remain
that way.
11. The rendering is reproduced in DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 203.
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Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference and set out to make a
difference.12
Their first approach was to Governor Nelson Rockefeller,
whose response was that if they did not like the Project, they
should buy the Mountain.13 Short of the required funds and with
Con Edison uninterested in selling, Scenic Hudson was relegated
to finding some other way of opposing the plant. The organizers
soon learned that the Project required a license from the FPC,
and after several weeks of searching, they hired a lawyer—Dale
Doty, a former FPC Commissioner—to represent them. The
hearings were scheduled to come on quickly, but Dale was able to
secure a delay of several months, giving him an opportunity to
prepare a rudimentary case.14
There were four days of hearings in 1964. Most of Scenic
Hudson’s testimony was directed toward the natural beauty and
historic importance of Storm King and the Highlands. But Dale
Doty also presented a witness who described alternatives in very
general terms. Con Edison’s cross-examination of the Scenic
Hudson witnesses was brutal. The FPC staff, for its part, backed
the Project with no pretense of objectivity or neutrality. When
the hearings were closed, the future looked grim.15
But Scenic Hudson chose to fight on and made a key decision
in this regard. It hired a public relations firm—Selvage & Lee—
to get the story out, and the new consultants immediately started
to do exactly that. Among other things, the firm organized a
flotilla of yachts and other boats to sail up the Hudson to Storm
King and plant signs in response to Con Edison’s then motto—
”Dig We Must for a Growing New York.” “Dig You Must Not,” the

12. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 91-96; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 207-08; BOYLE,
supra note 1, at 155-56.
13. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 95.
14. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 96-98; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 209-10; BOYLE,
supra note 1, at 157.
15. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 98-106; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 210-11;
BOYLE, supra note 1, at 157-58. All testimony before the FPC in the 1964 and
all subsequent hearings can be found in the transcripts of the proceedings in
Case No. 2338, copies of which are available in the Scenic Hudson archives at
Marist College. See Marist Environmental History Project, The Scenic Hudson
Decision
Hearings
Transcripts
Collection,
MARIST
COLLEGE,
http://library.marist.edu/archives/shdht/ shdht.xml (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
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signs read, and the national media picked the story up.16
Stephen Currier, a philanthropist whose lawyer happened to be
Lloyd Garrison, took note of the story and decided he wanted to
help. He was willing to give money if it could be used.17
As to that, there was no doubt—Scenic Hudson intended to
press on with the case. Alexander Lurkis, the recently-retired
Chief Engineer for the City’s Department of Water Supply, Gas
and Electricity, had written a Letter to The Editor of the Times,
identifying what he said was a superior alternative—a series of
jet engine gas turbine generators that were new to the market.
The PR firm reached out and hired him to develop the alternative
in detail. Scenic Hudson then persuaded a New York State
Senator to call legislative hearings on the Project in November of
1964. Lurkis made a detailed presentation of the alternative,
including cost comparisons showing his plan to be much less
costly than Cornwall.18
Also appearing was Bob Boyle, the Outdoors writer for Sports
Illustrated and a Hudson River worshipper writ-big. Boyle had
discovered a report from ten years earlier that suggested the
center of the spawning grounds for the recreationally- and
commercially-important Hudson River striped bass was at Storm
King Mountain. Since the Project would ingest vast amounts of
water—some 8,000,000 gallons a minute—in which the eggs and
fish larvae would be floating helplessly, the danger to the striped
bass population was obvious. What made the disclosure all the
more dramatic is that the study had been supervised by Con
Edison’s fisheries expert, who had testified in the FPC hearings
that the Plant posed no threat to aquatic or marine life.19
Scenic Hudson promptly arranged to have the Lurkis and
Boyle testimony submitted to the FPC, with a request that the
hearings be reopened to consider the new evidence.20 The FPC
rejected the submissions as untimely. Then, in February 1965,
16. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 212-13; see TALBOT, supra note 1, at 108-10;
BOYLE, supra note 1, at 156.
17. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 168; TALBOT, supra note 1, at 114-15.
18. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 111-12; DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 213; BOYLE,
supra note 1, at 162.
19. BOYLE, supra note 1, at 158-61, 165; TALBOT, supra note 1, at 112-14;
DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 213.
20. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 114; see BOYLE, supra note 1, at 164-65.
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the State Legislative Committee issued its report in which it
found the Lurkis testimony compelling and the Boyle discovery
disturbing. It urged the FPC to reopen the case, finding that the
scenic beauty of the area was unexcelled and concluding, with
respect to the Project, that “the committee must go on record as
being opposed to its approval.”21
All this went unheeded. On March 9, 1965, the FPC granted
the license application, finding, among other things, that the
scenic beauty of Storm King Mountain would not be diminished
by the plant but would actually be improved by the removal of a
number of derelict structures. It also found that there was no
feasible alternative and no danger to the fisheries.22
Two and a half weeks later, at the behest of Stephen Currier,
who agreed to finance the appeal, the case came to Mr. Garrison.
Actually, it did not come only to Mr. Garrison. Before Lloyd said
“yes,” he had recruited his partner to work with him. This was
Judge Simon Rifkind, one of the twentieth century’s great trial
and appellate attorneys, who, Lloyd believed, would argue the
case before the Second Circuit. As it turned out, that did not
happen, and Lloyd argued the case himself. But Judge Rifkind
made his own invaluable contributions.23
The first of these, which he and Mr. Garrison hit on jointly,
was to rename the Project. No longer would it be the Cornwall
Project, which had no sex-appeal.
In our briefs and
announcements, this was, from then on, the Storm King Project.
There is, for me, a certain irony in how central this minor
adjustment became as the case progressed. Storm King was all
very well, but this was a belated title. The original Dutch settlers
had called the mountain Boterberg, which, translated into
English, became Butter Hill. Can anyone doubt that a battle over
Butter Hill would have been considerably less impassioned than a
battle over Storm King? Happily, Nathaniel Willis, a romantic
21. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 213-14 n.15 (citing N.Y. STATE LEGIS.,
PRELIMINARY REP. OF THE JOINT LEGIS. COMM. ON NATURAL RES. ON THE HUDSON
RIVER VALLEY AND THE CONSOLIDATED EDISON CO. STORM KING MOUNTAIN
PROJECT 1-2 (1965)). See TALBOT, supra note 1, at 112 (suggesting that the
Report was drafted by one of Scenic Hudson’s PR consultants).
22. See generally FPC Opinion No. 452, supra note 6.
23. From this point on, except as otherwise indicated, the narrative of events
is based on the author’s personal experience and knowledge.
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writer who lived in the Highlands, felt Butter Hill was an
indignity for such a grand geological feature. Remembering the
clouds and lightning that raged around the Mountain in the
summer, he renamed it Storm King.24 So, if you will, modern
environmental law may be indebted to Mr. Willis for its start.
The further wisdom that Judge Rifkind brought to the case
was his counsel that it could not be won on the grounds that the
FPC had misjudged the impacts on scenic beauty, because of
what is known as the “substantial evidence” test. This traditional
test, incorporated into section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act,
provided that the Commission’s findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, were conclusive.25 Whatever else might be
said about the hearing record, there had been testimony on both
sides regarding the impacts of the Project on the landscape, and
that, the Judge felt, put the issue of scenic beauty beyond reach.
Instead, both he and Mr. Garrison agreed that we needed to
emphasize the gaps in the FPC record, including the limited
discussion of alternatives in light of the later Lurkis testimony
and the Commission’s indifference to fisheries impacts. The
Power Act expressly provided that a party to the FPC’s
proceedings could apply to the Circuit Court for leave to adduce
additional evidence,26 and this fit nicely with the idea that the
focus should be on what the Commission had largely ignored
rather than directly confronting the core issue of the damaging
impact of the Project on the natural beauty of the Hudson
Highlands. At the same time, Judge Rifkind urged that scenic
beauty be used to set the context of the case. Because the area
was so magnificent, we would argue—and did—that the FPC
24. TALBOT, supra note 1, at 9-10. The following quote from Willis’s Outdoors
at Idlewild is included in DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 63-64.
The tallest mountain, with its feet in the Hudson at the Highland
Gap, is officially called the Storm King—being looked to, by the
whole country around, as the most sure foreteller of a storm. When
the white cloud-beard descends upon his breast in the morning (as if
with a nod forward of his majestic head), there is sure to be a rainstorm before night. Standing aloft among the other mountains of the
chain, this sign is peculiar to him. He seems the monarch, and this
seems his stately ordering of a change in the weather. Should not
STORM-KING, then, be his proper title?
25. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2012).
26. Id.
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should have bent over backwards to find an alternative. Instead,
it sat on its hands.
After all the strategizing, Lloyd Garrison went to work, and
the papers he produced were exquisite. He had a poetic sense of
the English language and used it to extraordinary effect in our
briefs. Several of us—in time narrowed to myself—would prepare
drafts of different sections of the papers. Lloyd would then call
his secretary into his office and pacing back and forth would
dictate late into the night translating what he had been given
into prose that stirred the soul and made the desired outcome
seem obligatory. He had that knack, and it is not surprising that
many of the words Judge Hays used in the 1965 Scenic Hudson
opinion came directly from our briefs. My contribution was the
research, and I do not make light of that. But it was Lloyd
Garrison who put it to good use and created the road map that led
the Second Circuit to the decision it reached.
Lloyd was also acutely aware of the times in which we were
proceeding. He did not have much confidence the case could be
won, but to the extent there was hope, it was because, as Bob
Dylan sang, “the times, they were a-changin’.” This was 1965,
three years after Rachel Carson had published Silent Spring,
which in many ways changed Americans’ way of thinking about
the environment. The concern over DDT had already resulted in
one unsuccessful lawsuit.27 There were plans to dam the
Colorado in the Grand Canyon, and Dave Brower and the Sierra
Club were already on that case.28 Increasing concern was being
expressed about the new interstate highways being slashed
through cherished landscapes, and more and more Americans
found themselves impacted by the vast web of new transmission
wires being woven across the country to meet the soaring demand
for electricity. Perhaps most important of all, President Lyndon
B. Johnson had begun to emphasize the “quality of life” with his
27. See generally Murphy v. Benson, 151 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
28. The concern over the Grand Canyon dams culminated in a series of fullpage ads placed by the Sierra Club and David Brower in the New York Times
and the Washington Post in July 1966. These strongly opposed the dams. One
of them was headlined: “Should we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can
get nearer the ceiling?” Sierra Club, Should We Also Flood the Sistine Chapel So
Tourists
Can
Get
Nearer
the
Ceiling?
(1966),
available
at
http://www.infomarketingblog.com/space_ads/Sistine_Chapel.pdf.
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Great Society programs, and he related this specifically to
landscape in his 1965 State of the Union address, saying:
For over three centuries, the beauty of America has sustained our
spirit and enlarged our vision. We must act now to protect this
heritage. In a fruitful new partnership with the States and the
cities the next decade should be a conservation milestone. We
must make a massive effort to save the countryside and
establish—as a green legacy for tomorrow—more large and small
parks, more seashores and open spaces than have been created
during any other period in our national history. 29

The times, in short, were ripe for a case like Storm King to be
heard in federal court.
It is worth noting that President Johnson made no mention
of the environment. The word he used was conservation, and in
that sense, the new values being identified had their roots in the
past. We too thought in terms of conservation. Yet, as it turned
out, it was a conservation looking forward that soon enough
would morph into the broader environmental litigation
movement. But neither Lloyd nor I nor any of the others who
helped write the briefs had any idea that the case would have the
broad implications that it did. We were simply trying to save
Storm King.
The case was argued to the Second Circuit in late October
1965. Mr. Garrison was eloquent and persuasive. Con Edison’s
counsel ranted, to little effect. And the panel found it incredible
when the attorney for the FPC argued that the Project would
improve the scenery of the Highlands.
Two weeks later, the City went dark. The Great 1965
Blackout rolled out of Canada and within ten minutes, Con
Edison’s electric system closed down for thirteen hours. The next
day, the company had ads in every major paper stating that if the
Cornwall Project had been on line—and but for the opposition it
would be under construction—the City would have been saved.
And only Cornwall could have made the difference because of its
29. The full address can be found at the website of The American Presidency
Project. Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 4, 1965), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26907
(last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
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special hydro characteristics. The Lurkis alternative we were
asking the court to order the FPC to consider would have done no
good. Needless to say, we did not regard the Blackout as good
news.
The story, however, is that the three judges were in the midst
of reviewing a first draft of their opinion at the time the Blackout
hit and when the lights went out, they simply lit candles and
continued their work.30 This is probably apocryphal, but seven
weeks later, on December 29, 1965, the court came down with its
landmark Scenic Hudson decision. I will return to discuss the
opinion in a few minutes, noting only at this point that enough
commentators have suggested that modern environmental law
was born out of the decision to make me believe it might be
true.31
What I want to do first is to recount the rest of the story,
because the case did not end, and Storm King was not saved, for
another fifteen years. Of these, the first five were spent before
the FPC in two series of remanded hearings involving, among
other issues, impacts on natural beauty, geology, alternatives,
fisheries impacts, underground transmission, costs and the
potential of damaging the City’s Catskill Aqueduct. Among the
celebrities to give testimony on scenic beauty were Dave Brower,
Sierra Club Executive Director, Vincent Scully, distinguished
professor of art history at Yale, Brooks Atkinson, the New York
Times drama critic, and Richard Pough, founder of The Nature
Conservancy. Also putting in an appearance was Edward Teller,
father of the H Bomb, who testified in support of the commercial

30. DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 218.
31. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law and the General Welfare,
19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675 (2002) (Fourth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on
Environmental Law); A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental ‘Rule of
Law’ Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 583 (2002) (Sixth Annual Lloyd K.
Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law); John E. Bonine, Private Public
Interest Environmental Law: History, Hard Work and Hope, 26 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 465, 466 (2009) (15th Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental
Law); E-law: What Started It All?, Natural Resources Defense Council,
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). See also,
HOUCK, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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use of nuclear power, only to be embarrassed on cross
examination by knowing practically nothing about it.32
The concern over the Aqueduct arose when Con Edison
redesigned the powerhouse to relocate it largely underground.
This, however, required excavation and blasting within 140 feet
of the Aqueduct, which supplies 40% of the City’s water—
something the City strenuously opposed. This led to a further set
of hearings that also considered the possible relocation of the
plant into the Palisades Interstate Park. When the testimony
finally came to an end in 1969—almost three years after it had
begun—several rounds of briefing followed before a final appeal
to the full Commission, all of which came to naught.
In 1970, the FPC relicensed the Project, finding again that it
would do no damage to the natural beauty of Storm King
Mountain, brushing aside the risks to the Catskill Aqueduct and
finding, on the basis of an interagency report that had never been
placed in the record or subject to cross examination, that the
impacts on the Hudson River fish populations, including striped
bass, would be negligible.33
32. The remanded hearings began in the fall of 1966, and were continued
originally to May 1967. In 1968, the hearings were reopened to consider the
potential dangers to the City’s Catskill Aqueduct and continued into 1969. The
testimony in the hearings can be found in the transcripts for FPC Project 2338,
available in the Scenic Hudson Archives of the Marist College Library. It is
worth quoting Professor Scully’s testimony. In giving the basis for his
conclusion that the redesigned powerhouse would damage the scenic features of
Storm King Mountain, he responded:
. . . Storm King is the central issue, and it is a mountain that should
be left alone. It rises like a brown bear out of the river, a dome of
living granite, swelling with animal power. It is not picturesque in
the softer sense of the word, but awesome, a primitive embodiment
of the energies of the earth. It makes the character of wild nature
physically visible in monumental form. As such it strongly reminds
me of some of the natural formations which mark sacred sites in
Greece and signal the presence of the Gods; it preserves and
embodies the most savage and untrammeled characteristics of the
wild at the very threshold of New York. It can still make the city
dweller emotionally aware of what he most needs to know: that
nature still exists, with its own laws, rhythms, and powers, separate
from human desires.
DUNWELL, supra note 1, at 220.
33. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., Fed. Power Comm’n, Opinion No. 584,
Project No. 2338, 85 P.U.R.3d 129 (F.P.C.) (1970) [hereinafter FPC Opinion No.
584].
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Scenic Hudson again appealed, joined this time by the Sierra
Club and other national conservation organizations represented
by David Sive, and also joined by the City and the Palisades
Interstate Park Commission. The difference this time around
was that there were 19,000 pages of testimony and 675 exhibits
to which the FPC could point as “substantial evidence” to support
its conclusions. Faced with the expansive record, which we
understood would carry great weight, our briefs laid their
principal emphasis on the Commission’s failure to honor the
earlier Scenic Hudson mandate in substance and spirit, rather
than simply by mouthing the words. In effect, we asked the court
not to apply the “substantial evidence” test in the area of scenic
and historic values and to recognize that only the judiciary could
offset the inherent bias of the FPC and its lack of expertise in
matters of culture and aesthetics.
Our briefs were bulky and lacked the easy logic that had
been so successful in 1965. Mr. Garrison labored mightily, as did
I, but the ringing prose of our earlier briefs often eluded us.
In the end, the majority of the three judges rejected our
arguments and upheld the Commission’s re-licensing of the
Storm King Project. In doing so, the court summarized at some
length the evidence that supported the FPC findings and then
applied the “substantial evidence” test. There being testimony on
both sides of every issue, the Commission’s findings were
conclusive, and that was that.34
Judge Oakes dissented in an opinion which sharply
illuminated the divide between traditional interpretations of
administrative law, which the majority of the panel had adhered
to, and the potential of a new kind of judicial review in matters
involving the environment, which, if it had been accepted, could
have changed the fundamental relationship between the agencies
and the courts in such matters. I will return to this subject in a
few minutes, but I think it is worth quoting here the portion of
the Oakes dissent where he made his point:
The final matters which, to my mind, tip the scales for a reversal
rather than simply a reversal and remand are two. The first
34. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463,
463 (2d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter Scenic Hudson II].
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concerns what may broadly be called aesthetics, impairment by
the project of the mountain’s scenic grandeur. The commission’s
Findings 148 refers to the mountain “swallow[ing]” the “scar of
the highway, the intrusive railroad structure and fills and
tolerat[ing] both the barges and scows which pass by it and the
thoughtless humans [sic] who visit it without seeing it. . . .” The
findings go on to say that just as the mountain swallows present
day intrusions, “it will swallow the structures which will serve
the needs of people for electric power.” This argument borders on
the outrageous; it can be used to justify every intrusion on nature
from strip mining to ocean oil spills . . . . Two scenic wrongs do
not necessarily make a right. On the basis of the commission’s
thesis, wherever you have one billboard you can put two,
wherever you have one overhead transmission line you can put
another, you can add blight to blight to blight.
That a
responsible federal agency should advance that proposition in the
form of a finding and in the teeth of the NEPA seems to me
shocking. The commission’s finding overlooks the fact that we
are considering here a power station which above ground will
consist of a concrete tailrace with abutments 32 feet high and 685
feet long, cutting back existing shore line from 195 to 260 feet,
exclusive of any access road. This location, as the commission
concedes, is on a small riverbottom foothill which “is visually a
part of Storm King Mountain.” The mountain may “swallow” the
project, but the concrete tailrace and abutments, as long as a
good-sized football stadium—over an eighth of a mile—and three
stories high, will surely be stuck in its craw. 35

It is worth noting that if Judge Oakes had prevailed, he
would have reversed the FPC decision without any remand. The
court would have had the last word. The court would have
identified the values that deserved to be protected, and that
would have been the end of it.
At this point, many felt the game was over, but it was not.
Early in 1972, before Con Edison could start construction,
Congress passed the Clean Water Act Amendments, which, in
section 401, required that before any federal license could be
issued that affected the waters of the United States, the state in
35. Id. at 491 (Oakes, J. dissenting) (internal footnotes omitted). A petition
for rehearing en banc was denied by an equally-divided Second Circuit, with
Justice Timbers adding his own dissent.
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which the project was located had to certify that its operation
would comply with state water quality standards.36 The Storm
King Project fell within the definition and New York State
ordered hearings. When DEC granted the certification, Scenic
Hudson (which I now represented on my own) appealed. We won
in the Supreme Court, before a Judge with the wonderful name of
DeForest C. Pitt,37 but the decision was reversed by the Appellate
Division, and the Court of Appeals upheld the reversal.38 In the
intermediate eighteen months, however, Con Edison had held off
beginning construction due to the pending litigation.
In early 1974, the company announced that it intended to
start and began to assemble a construction team on site.
However, it was a reluctant start, because by then, Con Edison
was in serious financial distress. The company felt forced to
initiate construction because the Federal Power Act required that
work begin within four years of the date the license was issued or
the license would lapse.
Before work could start, Scenic Hudson brought another
lawsuit, invoking section 404 of the Clean Water Act
Amendments, which required a permit for any landfill in
navigable waters.39 The Storm King project included fifty-seven
acres of landfill—the material blasted from the Mountain was to
be dumped along the waterfront immediately to the north and
used for a local park. Con Edison, initially supported by the
government, argued that the Federal Power Act overrode all
other legislation. But after thinking about it a while, the
government changed its mind and supported our position that
section 404 applied and a permit was needed. The U.S. District
Court agreed and enjoined the landfill, but not the entire
project.40 The Second Circuit affirmed.41
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), (a)(6) (2012).
37. See generally deRham v. Diamond, 69 Misc. 2d 1 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty.
1972).
38. See generally deRham v. Diamond, 39 A.D.2d 302 (3d Dep’t 1972), aff’d 32
N.Y.2d 34 (1973).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
40. See generally Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp.
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
41. See generally Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 127
(2d Cir. 1974).
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Meanwhile, licensing hearings for the nuclear plants at
Indian Point had revealed that the fisheries study on which the
FPC had based its 1970 licensing decision—the interagency
report that was not in the record and had never been subject to
cross examination—was fundamentally flawed. It had failed to
take account of the tidal nature of the Hudson and, as a result,
had understated the potential impact of Storm King on the
striped bass population. Rather than 4% of the first year striped
bass being sucked into the plant, the corrected number was
40%—a harrowing threat to the fisheries.42
Armed with this information, Angus Macbeth, one of the
original NRDC attorneys who represented the Hudson River
Fisherman’s Association, petitioned the FPC to revisit the
fisheries impacts of the plant on a novel theory. In granting the
license, the Commission had included a condition requiring Con
Edison to continue to study the potential fisheries impacts and if
necessary to modify the operations of the plant to mitigate the
damage.43 Angus asked the Commission to address the new
evidence on impacts under this license condition and to do so
immediately in view of the extraordinary magnitude of the
change in the predicted damage. It was a brilliant concept that
invoked the limited protections the FPC had itself included in the
license.
At the same time, Scenic Hudson petitioned the FPC to reopen the entire proceedings based not only on the discrepancies in
the fisheries report, but also because the economics of the Project
had changed compared to the gas turbine alternative, as revealed
in a detailed study by the City’s Department of Environmental
Protection. When the FPC denied both petitions, Angus and I
appealed for a third time to the Second Circuit.
The prospects of success were not great.
There were
powerful Supreme Court precedents to the effect that once a
42. The study was conducted by a Policy Committee funded by Con Edison
that included representatives of the company, the Fish & Wildlife Service and
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. The Policy
Committee's report, which was issued after the hearings closed, but before the
FPC had issued its 1970 licensing opinion, was titled Hudson River Fisheries
Investigation 1965-68. See Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 498 F.2d 827, 830-31 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. FPC Opinion No. 584, supra note 32, at Articles 15, 16, 36.
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license survives judicial review, the courts cannot revisit it again,
even though circumstances may have changed dramatically;
otherwise, the administrative process would never come to an
end. At the same time, the potential impacts on the striped bass
were frightening, and the new calculations of those impacts had
been made by government scientists and biologists. At the
argument, the panel was clearly sympathetic to our position, and
in the end, in a truly remarkable decision (which is well worth
reading), the court avoided the Supreme Court precedents by
ordering the FPC to promptly hold hearings on the discredited
study under the license condition that the Commission itself had
approved.44 The court denied the Scenic Hudson petition to
reopen the hearings in their entirety, but said that if, by the end
of year, the hearings had shown that the damage to the striped
bass could be substantial, a full reopening might be ordered.45
By this time—early May 1974—construction had begun at
Storm King, but on a limited scale. The first charges of dynamite
had been laid and the first rock blasted to create the main water
tunnel, but Con Edison was clearly in no hurry. In an effort to
stop the work altogether, I asked the Second Circuit to issue an
injunction against construction in light of its decision, which
might require the reopening of the entire case and
reconsideration of the entire project. Con Edison responded by
saying it would forfeit its license if it could not proceed. The
Court of Appeals denied my request, but in doing so offered its
opinion that construction had clearly started within the meaning
of the Federal Power Act and if the company were to stop building
at this point, there would be no license forfeiture.46 A week later,
Con Edison called a halt to the work. It was never to start up
again.
There is much more to the story, but because my time is
limited, I will abbreviate the later chapters. The fisheries
hearings that the Second Circuit ordered were both exciting and
revealing.
Faced with the court’s deadline, the FPC did
everything it could—fair and unfair—in an effort to expedite
them. But the evidence was insistent, confirming in short order
44. See generally Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n, 498 F.2d 827.
45. Id. at 835.
46. Id. (On Petitions for Rehearing).
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the fundamental flaw in the 1970 fisheries report and then
exposing the potential for severe damage to the striped bass, with
little to rebut that conclusion. As the year-end approached with a
record developing in the wrong way, Con Edison and the FPC
petitioned the Second Circuit for more time to carry out
additional studies to try to disprove the adverse impacts. The
Court of Appeals granted the request for additional time and
rejected a simultaneous petition by Scenic Hudson to reopen the
case in its entirety. But in doing so, it enjoined further work on
the Project. Shortly after that, the Department of the Interior
and the FPC’s own staff came to the conclusion that the plant
should not be built. The handwriting was on the wall.
Still, it took another five years before Con Edison
surrendered its license and gave the property it had acquired for
the Project to the Palisades Park Commission. There were no
more court decisions. The coup de grace came by way of a
complex settlement agreement negotiated over two years and
involving not only the Storm King Project but also seven other
power plants that used the Hudson for cooling water, three of
which had been ordered by EPA to install closed-cycle cooling to
protect the fisheries. Russell Train, the first chair of the Council
on Environment Quality and EPA Administrator from 1973 to
1977, served as an independent mediator and worked a miracle in
bringing the twelve parties to the table and helping them forge a
final agreement, which was signed in December 1980.47
In addition to giving up the Storm King Project, Con Edison
and its fellow utilities agreed to modify the operations of their
other power plants to sharply reduce the intake of water during
the critical spawning and early growth seasons; they contributed
$12 million to establish a Hudson River research foundation; and
most important of all—at least to the lawyers—they agreed to
pay $500,000 of our legal fees. In return for these and other
concessions, the utilities were relieved of their obligations to build
cooling towers at Indian Point and two other large power plants.
The settlement was hailed by the New York Times as a “Peace
47. For an excellent description of the settlement and settlement negotiation,
see ALLAN R. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION 1-24 (1983). For materials bearing on the settlement, including the
actual settlement agreement, see SETTLEMENT MATERIALS, supra note 1.
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Treaty for the Hudson.”48 Charles Luce, Chairman of Con
Edison, was more pointed.
“We lost the fight,” he
acknowledged.49 Bob Boyle, President of the Hudson River
Fisherman’s Association, put in another way: “We raked in most
of the chips and they got cab fare home.”50 Thus, the saga of
Storm King came to an end.
So, the story of persistence aside, what did it all mean? How
does the case bear on environmental law today? Is there a legacy
or has the promise of the 1965 decision been cut short? These are
questions that I would like to address in my remaining time.
I begin with standing. This is one of the most frequently
referenced bases on which the Scenic Hudson decision is
identified as having initiated modern environmental law. That
standing was an issue at all was almost accidental. The Federal
Power Act provided that any person aggrieved by an FPC decision
could seek review in the Court of Appeals, and as we drafted our
initial papers, it never occurred to us that there was any question
of Scenic Hudson’s right to appeal. It was the FPC, out of the
blue, that challenged standing. It was fortunate for us that the
Federal Power Act required that any license that FPC issued be
in accordance with a comprehensive plan for the waterway,
including, in specific language added only in 1935, “recreational
use.”51 We were also fortunate that in an earlier case, the FPC,
in a decision written by Dale Doty, had itself recognized the

48. Editorial: A Peace Treaty for the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 20, 1980), at
24.
49. HOUCK, supra note 1, at 19.
50. Id.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2012). It is interesting to note that in 1986, the
following specific language was added to the Act in section 4(e), 16 U.S.C. §
797(e):
In deciding whether to issue any license under [16 U.S.C. §§ 792-825] for
any project, the Commission, in addition to the power and development
purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal consideration to
the purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of
damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including related
spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational
opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of environmental
quality.
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maintenance of natural beauty as a component of recreational use
and had denied a license on that basis.52
We argued, and the court accepted, that because the Federal
Power Act recognized and forwarded recreational uses, including
the maintenance of scenic beauty, as a factor, the FPC was
required to take into account, the judicial review provisions of the
Act had to be read to empower those specially interested in
protecting recreation and scenic beauty to seek review under
those provisions. If there had been no reference to “recreational
uses” in the statute, our contentions regarding standing might
have been for naught.
What made the Second Circuit holding the more remarkable,
however, and what, as much as anything else, laid the basis for
environmental litigation going forward under the Administrative
Procedure Act, was the court’s holding that “interest” constituted
an appropriate basis for standing, and that under a statute such
as the Federal Power Act, interest in the environment, without a
pecuniary stake, was sufficient to confer standing. As the court
put it:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will
adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational aspects of power development,
those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special
interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of
“aggrieved” parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal
Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special
interests.53

In retrospect, this may have been the most thrilling and
potentially expansive of all the court’s holdings. This was so in
major part because it explicitly said that petitioners like Scenic
Hudson did not have to suffer economic damage to be able to sue.
But beyond this, the decision effectively held that the case and
controversy requirement of Article III could be met as a result of
52. Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 216 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir.
1954).
53. Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965) (citing Wash. Dep’t of
Game v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 n.11 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S 936 (1954)) (emphasis added).
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injury to a special interest in the environment, rather than the
more traditional concept of “injury in fact” or “to self.” If future
decisions had continued down this road, ease of access to the
courts for environmental claimants would have been much
greater than it is today.
Unhappily, this was not the case. Six years later, in Sierra
Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court held that interest alone was
not enough—there had to be injury in fact.54 The decision,
however, upheld the central Scenic Hudson holding that economic
injury was not a prerequisite to standing and made it relatively
easy for both organizational and individual petitioners to meet
the threshold requirements in most environmental law cases.55
The story after that is a matter of highs, followed by lows,
followed, in Laidlaw and Massachusetts v. EPA, by a return to
somewhat more liberal standing requirements.56 But the switch
of a single vote on the Supreme Court would make entry to the
courts ever more difficult for environmental interests. It is hard
to comprehend how, after the promise of Scenic Hudson, the
Supreme Court and, until recently, the New York State Court of
Appeals,57 have moved quite so far in the opposite direction. In
54. 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
55. Id. at 735-38.
56. See generally Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Several earlier
Supreme Court decisions had significantly narrowed the scope of standing in
environmental cases. See generally Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The Laidlaw and
Massachusetts v. EPA decisions were both in the direction of liberalizing
standing somewhat, but have certainly not returned the situation to where it
was in the 1970s. For valuable articles on problems and directions of standing
in environmental litigation, see, e.g., Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of
Justice: Standing in Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 27 (2003); David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment,
and Other Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2004); Oliver A. Houck,
Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1
(2007); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does
Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Future Generations to Come?, 34
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009).
57. The New York State Court of Appeals only recently eased the standing
requirements in environmental lawsuits, conforming them fairly closely to those
laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton. See generally
Save the Pinebush, Inc. v. Common Council of City of Albany, 13 N.Y.3d 297
(2009).
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this regard, it is my view that the full promise of the 1965
decision has not been fulfilled.
A second basis for regarding the Scenic Hudson opinion as a
landmark is the importance it attached to alternatives. To my
considerable consternation when I was doing research for our
initial brief, the Federal Power Act did not refer specifically to
alternatives, but Mr. Garrison was confident that the overall
public interest language of the statute required their
consideration. Here, I think, my research actually made a
difference. I was able to find two cases in the D.C. Circuit that
reversed FPC decisions for failing to evaluate proffered
alternatives under the Federal Natural Gas Act, which was also
administered by the FPC.58 The circumstances in both those
cases were so akin to the FPC’s rejection of the Lurkis testimony
that it was no stretch to assert that the same standard should be
applied under the Federal Power Act. All we were asking the
court was to hold the FPC to a standard that had already been
established in other cases—we invoked what Professor Tarlock
has called the “rule of law.”59 Our goal was to make the court’s
decision easier in circumstances where the “substantial evidence”
rule usually overrode everything else.
In this, we succeeded beyond anything we had imagined.
The court’s strong language, which included extended references
to the Lurkis proposal (rather than dismissing it as merely a
conflict of experts), as well as an elaboration of the cases I had
found as guiding precedents, raised the evaluation of alternatives
58. Mich. Consol. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 283 F.2d 204, 226 (D.C. Cir.
1960), cert. denied, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co.,
364 U.S. 913 (1960); City of Pittsburgh v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 237 F.2d 741,
751 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
59. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental ‘Rule of Law’
Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002) (Sixth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison
Lecture on Environmental Law). The observations made by Professor Tarlock in
his presentation apply not only to the issue of alternatives, but even more so to
our briefing, and the Second Circuit’s analysis, of why the FPC was obligated to
consider the preservation of scenic beauty. This derived from a reading of
section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, which required that the Project be “best
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway” for,
among purposes, recreation. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1). We used this language to
inject environmental issues—the protection of scenic beauty and fisheries
resources—into the case, arguing that all we were asking was for the court to
enforce the section 10(a) obligation. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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to a new level of importance. The court, in effect, articulated—or
some would say created—a standard that when important
natural resources are in issue, the search for alternatives must be
exactly that—searching. Out of this, in turn, came NEPA’s
requirement that federal agencies “study, develop, and describe
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning
alternative uses of available resources,” and that they also
include an analysis of alternatives in every EIS.60
For several years after NEPA was enacted, the courts
enforced the alternatives mandates of NEPA rigorously,
culminating, perhaps, in Judge Mansfield’s opinion in NRDC v.
Callaway.61 However, it has been mostly downhill since then.
Indeed, after the initial ringing affirmations of NEPA in cases
such as Calvert Cliffs,62 it has generally been downhill for the
statute as a whole. As Professor Rogers put it in an earlier
Garrison Lecture, the Supreme Court has largely emasculated
the effectiveness of NEPA,63 reducing it to a series of procedural
hoops through which most federal agencies have long since
learned to jump without it having any effect on their decisions.
And the situation is worse in New York State under SEQRA.
Indeed, in many cases, New York City agencies use the
alternatives sections of environmental impact statements to
justify the action they are proposing, rather than making any
serious effort to identify options that might have less of a

60. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(E), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(E)
(2012); § 102(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii). See also Oliver Houck, Unfinished
Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 878 (2002) (“The original Second Circuit
opinion opened the way for citizen suit standing . . . [and] the principles of
review of environmental impacts and alternatives that are at the heart of NEPA
. . . .”) (internal footnotes omitted).
61. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1975).
62. See generally Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic
Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
63. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Defeating Environmental Law: The Geology of
Legal Advantage, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 687, 698 (2002) (Third Annual Lloyd
K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law).
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negative impact.64 Here, too, in my judgment, the promise of the
Scenic Hudson decision has not been fulfilled.
Lastly, I turn to what many of us felt was the most
significant of all the court’s holdings. This followed from Judge
Hays’ ringing directive that the FPC’s renewed proceedings “must
include as a basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and
of national historic shrines, keeping in mind that, in our affluent
society, the cost of a project is only one of several factors to be
considered.”65
For me—and I think for Mr. Garrison as well—this seemed to
signal that the courts—or at least the judges of the Second
Circuit—were prepared to inject into the legal process, as a
fundamental consideration, the same concern for the environment
that President Johnson had spoken about earlier in 1965. After
all, Judge Hays did not say that the FPC simply had to take the
preservation of scenic beauty into account—he directed that the
Commission do so as a basic concern. In that moment, and for
that moment, it appeared that the judiciary, recognizing the
inherent biases of administrative agencies and knowing how they
had often been taken over by the industries they were asked to
regulate, was prepared to make its own judgments regarding
priorities when environmental damage was threatened. If that
had happened, a new environmental common law might have
followed, placing in the courts a broader role when environmental
conflicts were involved—a balancing function that did not
automatically defer to agencies on the basis of their supposed
expertise but closely scrutinized their decisions and, in the end,
applied the courts’ own series of developing environmental
precedents to future decisions.
Unfortunately, this was not to be. The high water mark of
what in my view turned out to be an aborted attempt to take a
different approach in cases involving threats to the environment
64. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, NOTICE OF COMPLETION OF THE
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT [FOR] 53 WEST 53RD STREET, CEQR
No. 09DCP004M (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/
env_review/53_west_53/notice_completion_feis.pdf (where the impacts of the
1,250 foot high tower that is the subject of this EIS is justified on the basis that
a totally theoretically “as-of-right” alternative would have essentially the same
impacts).
65. Scenic Hudson I, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis added).
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was probably Overton Park, where the Supreme Court held that
the judiciary was obligated to closely scrutinize a substantive
decision of the Secretary of Transportation to approve a highway
through a Memphis Park, when the Federal Highway Act said
that that could only be justified if there was no prudent and
One might have thought from that
feasible alternative.66
decision, and from early NEPA decisions such as Calvert Cliffs,
that the judiciary recognized the urgency of protecting the
American landscape and the environmental health of its citizens
and was prepared to play an expanded role in cases that came
before it. Instead, the courts stepped back, or were required to
step back by decisions of the Supreme Court that, as
commentators have noted, have reduced environmental litigation
to little more than a subset of administrative law.
The handwriting, I think, was on the wall in the second
Scenic Hudson decision.67 As I have already noted, Judge Oakes
was prepared to take the step that could have led to a more
expansive role for the courts in matters of the environment. He
was prepared to look at the realities and make the decision that
the FPC had not treated the preservation of scenic beauty as a
basic concern. And he was ready to say that in the circumstances
of the case, the law, as articulated by the courts, required that
conservation values be given priority (or at least that they not be
relegated to a “so-what” status). Thus, he would not only have
vacated the license—he would have called an end to the Project
altogether (rather than remand it to the FPC for yet another
round of hearings). That was a decision that he felt it was
appropriate for the courts to make.
Judge Hays, on the other hand, who had laid down the
criterion that the preservation of scenic beauty be treated as a
basic concern, was unwilling to act on that criterion the second
time around. Instead, he retreated to the traditional rules, which
deferred almost entirely to the agency’s supposed expertise. As
long as there was evidence on both sides of the issue, the courts
had to defer to the agency. Biases and values and even the state

66. See generally Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971).
67. See generally Scenic Hudson II, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
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of the nation had no bearing; the agencies, not the courts, had
been given the decision-making role.
In my view, that is the dogma that continues to operate
today. There have, of course, been resounding litigation victories
in the environmental arena, but few of them have been
substantive. Where statutes are involved—and soon after Scenic
Hudson, statutes became the fundamental and overriding form
that defined environmental law—courts have regularly held
agencies to the mandates of the law. But where discretion is
involved—where priorities have not been set out in legislation—
the courts have largely maintained a passive role. The fact that
environmental quality may be at stake has not made a difference.
It could have been otherwise. In their time, judges like
Skelly Wright, Bazelon, Mansfield and Oakes were willing to
wade in, to take an active role in shaping the law—one might
even say in creating it—in the environmental arena.68 But today,
there seems little enthusiasm among judges to think or act in an
expansionist way. And for good reason: the Supreme Court has
discouraged it. Still, in his time, Judge Cardozo was able to
change fundamentally the reach of tort law from his seat on our
State’s Court of Appeals. Perhaps one day another Cardozo will
do that for environmental law.
Great leaps have, in fact, been made. I recommend to you
Oliver Houck’s recent book Taking Back Eden, which recounts
cases in Japan, the Philippines, India, Russia, and Greece, where
the judiciary has taken upon itself the role of determining the
priority of competing values and has handed down decisions,
many of them constitutionally-based, holding that a Shinto
temple, the Taj Mahal, a Russian glade or the Philippine forests
take priority, and if other branches of government are unwilling
or unable to protect them, the courts will.69 So, too, in Argentina,
where, commenting on a court decision that ordered the clean up
of a filthy river running through the poorest part of Buenos Aires,

68. In addition to Judge Oakes’ dissent in Scenic Hudson II, see, e.g., Calvert
Cliffs’ Coordinating Council v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d. 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Skelly Wright, J.); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 524
F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J.); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, J.).
69. See generally HOUCK, supra note 1.
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the chief judge explained the ruling, which many regarded as
beyond the proper role of the judiciary, by saying rather dryly,
“the function of the court is to make noise.”70
It has always been so, from the earliest days of the English
chancery. In the United States, it is a role that inevitably raises
issues of the separation of powers and, indeed, of democracy
itself. Yet our courts have risen up to make noise on many
occasions, not least of all in John Marshall’s seminal
constitutional rulings and more recently, when the Supreme
Court set the civil rights revolution in motion in Brown v. Board
of Education.71 Protection of the environment may seem of lesser
importance, and in terms of individual rights, that is true. But in
terms of the collective—of our society as a whole—the
implications of a degraded environment—a National treasure
irrevocably defaced or the continuing loss of the ecosystems that
sustain us—are equally compelling. We can hope—and I do
hope—that you will live to see the courts assume a more active
role once again. Or better yet, that some of you will be part of
making it happen.

70. Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of Environmental Law, 26 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 455-56 (2009) (Fifteenth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture
on Environmental Law).
71. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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